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JURISDICTION 
Interveners (identified in the caption above) do not dispute the statement of 
jurisdiction made by appellant Medisys Technologies, Inc. ("Medisys"). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
1. Did the trial court err in awarding fees to the Interveners in connection 
with their efforts to defeat a "wrongful" injunction within the meaning of Utah R. 
Civ.P. 65A(c)(2)?] 
Standard of Review: If a party defeats a wrongfully issued injunction, that 
party is entitled to fees and costs. Green River Canal Co. v. Thayn, 84 P.3d 1134 
(Utah 2003). It thus appears to be an abuse of discretion not to make such an 
award. 
2. Regardless whether Rule 65A(c)(2) applies here, did the trial court err 
in awarding attorney's fees and costs based on its own inherent powers, when 
Medisys failed to disclose critical facts when it obtained the injunction, and the 
trial court ruled that it never would have issued the injunction had it known the 
facts? 
Standard of Review: The decision whether a litigant's behavior was 
sufficiently egregious to justify an award of fees under this standard is one of fact, 
reviewed for clear error. Rohan v. Boseman, 46 P.3d 753, 759 (Utah App. 2002). 
lA copy of Rule 65 A appears as Exhibit A hereto. 
3. Did the trial court abuse its discretion in awarding the amount of fees 
and costs at issue? 
Standard of Review: Abuse of Discretion. Bakowski v. Mountain States 
Steel Inc., 52 P.3d 1179, 1188 (Utah 2002). 
COURSE OF THE PROCEEDINGS 
The Interveners held shares in Medisys. The Interveners sued Medisys1 
directors in Florida, alleging breaches of fiduciary duty. Medisys' directors caused 
Medisys to sue the Interveners in Louisiana, seeking to rescind the merger 
transaction pursuant to which the Interveners obtained their Medisys shares. 
In aid of the Louisiana litigation, Medisys and its stock transfer agent, 
Interstate — with no notice to Interveners — filed a collusive lawsuit in the Third 
Judicial District Court for Salt Lake County, pursuant to which Medisys "sued" 
Interstate for an injunction enjoining Interstate from honoring any transfers of the 
Interveners' Medisys shares. Rather than contest the "lawsuit," Interstate 
immediately consented to entry of judgment, the result of which was an injunction 
— of which no notice was given to the Interveners — killing all sales of the 
Interveners' stock. 
The Interveners learned of the injunction only when one of the them tried to 
sell shares and was refused. The Interveners ultimately succeeded in dissolving the 
injunction, and then moved for an award of fees and costs under Utah R. Civ.P. 
65A(c)(2) because the injunction was wrongful. Relying both on Rule 65A(c)(2) 
and the court's inherent powers, the trial court awarded fees and costs, finding that 
Medisys had failed to disclose material facts in seeking the injunction, and that had 
in been apprised of the facts, the court would never have entered the injunction. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
I. The Interveners. 
1. Intervener Brett J. Phillips was a director of Medisys from December 
22, 1998 until May 10, 2000. Rec. at 26, \ 2 (Affidavit of Bret J. Phillips ("Phillips 
Aff")). 
2. At the time the injunction in this case issued, Phillips owned in 
excess of 3,350,000 shares of Medisys stock. Id. and Rec. at 29 - 33 (copies of 
Phillips' share certificates). 
3. None of Phillips' stock had been cancelled when the injunction issued. 
Phillips Aff., Rec. at 26, % 2. 
4. Intervener Carl Anderson was a director of Medisys from December 
22, 1998 to May 10, 2000. Rec. at 37, \ 2 (Affidavit of Carl Anderson ("Anderson 
Aff")). 
5. At the time the injunction in this case issued, Anderson owned 
4,795,489 shares of Medisys stock. Id. and Rec. at 43 - 49 (Anderson's share 
certificates). 
6. None of Anderson's stock had been cancelled when the injunction 
issued. Anderson Aff, Rec. at 37,^ } 2. 
7. Intervener William H. Morris was a director of Medisys from 
December 22, 1998 until May 10, 2000. Rec. at 50, If 2 (Affidavit of William H. 
Moms ("Morris Aff.")). 
8. At the time the injunction in this case issued, Morris, together with his 
wife Marilyn, owned 5,020,684 shares of Medisys stock. Id. and Rec. at 53 - 61 
(Morris's share certificates). 
9. None of Morris's stock had been cancelled when the injunction issued. 
Morris Aff, Rec. at 50, \ 2. 
10. At the time the injunction in this case issued, Medisys' stock was 
trading for about $1.00 a share. Rec. at 28. 
11. According to a Form 8-K which Medisys filed with the Securities and 
Exchange Commission, Statement of Facts, infra, \ 21, the trial court's injunction 
restrained the sale of 13,500,000 shares. 
II. Prior Pending Litigation between the Interveners and Medisys. 
12. At the time the injunction in this case issued, interveners Anderson, 
Phillips and Morris had filed an action in the United States District Court for the 
Middle District of Florida against the Medisys directors, alleging the commission 
of various improper acts in connection with their management of the company. 
13. At the time the injunction in this case issued, Medisysf directors had 
caused Medisys to sue the Interveners in the United States District Court for the 
Middle District of Louisiana, seeking rescission of the merger between Medisys 
and Phillips Pharmatech, a company founded by the Interveners and merged into 
Medisys, pursuant to which Interveners had obtained their Medisys stock. Rec. at 
165 (Louisiana complaint). 
III. In Connection with the Louisiana Lawsuit, Medisys and Interstate 
Collude in Utah to Enjoin Interveners from Transferring Shares. 
14. As it later explained in the Form 8-K that filed with the Securities and 
Exchange Commission, Statement of Facts, infra, If 21, Medisys decided that it 
wanted, in connection with the Louisiana suit, to enjoin the Interveners from 
selling their Medisys shares pending resolution of that suit. 
15. Yet Medisys did not seek an injunction against the Interveners in the 
Louisiana lawsuit: relying on the fact that a sale of stock cannot be completed until 
the stock transfer agent for the issuer (Medisys) registers the transfer of shares, 
Medisys convinced Interstate, Medisys' transfer agent (and a Utah company), not 
to honor any transfers of the Interveners' Medisys shares, thus effectively killing all 
sales. 
16. To carry out this scheme, Medisys and Interstate — giving no notice to 
the Interveners -- filed the following papers in the Third Judicial District Court, 
Salt Lake County, Utah, on June 6, 2000: 
(a) Medisys "sued" Interstate seeking to enjoin Interstate from registering 
the transfer of Interveners Medisys1 shares, thus precluding 
Interveners from selling their Medisys stock. Rec. at 1. (Complaint). 
(b) Interstate answered the complaint and admitted everything, save for a 
few details denied on the lack of information and belief. Rec. at 9. 
(c) Medisys filed a motion for judgment on the pleadings, on the basis 
that Interstate had admitted all of the allegations. Rec. at 12. 
(d) Interstate responded that "Defendant does not intend to dispute any of 
the factual allegations of Plaintiffs Complaint, waives any further 
time for response and joins with Plaintiff to request a decision." Rec. 
at 14. 
17. Based on these papers, on June 28, 2000, the trial court entered an 
injunction restraining Interstate from registering any transfer of the Interveners1 
Medisys shares. Rec. at 6 2 - 6 3 . The court interlineated the order to reflect that 
Interstate consented to the relief sought. Rec. at 62. 
IV. Medisys Confirms that the Utah Injunction was Directed Against the 
Interveners and was Part of the Louisiana Effort. 
18. In its "complaint" against Interstate, Medisys alleged that "Plaintiff 
seeks an injunction to prevent the transfer of the Medisys Technologies, Inc. stock 
issued in the above alleged reorganization," and then identified the Interveners' 
stock certificates. Rec. at 4, f 16. 
19. Although it had thus identified the Interveners' shares as the target of 
its injunction, Medisys alleged in the complaint's very next paragraph that "this 
action and this Court's order does not and is not intended to have res adjudicata 
effect on present holders of the Medisys certificates and shares. Rec, at 4, ^ 17 
20. The order which Medisys drafted for the trial court recited as follows: 
Based on this Cour 's further finding that the shares for which transfer 
is being enjoined are restricted . . . and on the further holding of this 
Court that this injunction and these findings are not res adjudicata to 
the holder of shares, a minimum bond should be required . . . . 
21. Yet the injunction operated directly against the Interveners by 
stopping all sales of their stock, a point Medisys made very clearly in a July 21, 
2000 Form 8-K filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission, Rec. at 40 -
42, wherein Medisys noted that the Interveners were indeed the target of the 
injunction, and that the injunction had been undertaken in connection with the 
Louisiana lawsuit: 
In connection with the Company's March 16, 2000 [Louisiana] 
lawsuit, [Medisys] filed with the Third District Court, Salt Lake 
County, Utah, an action seeking an injunction to prevent the sale 
and/or transfer of shares of the Company's common stock by various 
defendants in the Company's suit and other parties. On June 28, 
2000, the Utah Court issued an injunction and order enjoining from 
transfer approximately 13,500,000 shares of the Company's common 
stock. The Company believes that it is vital to the success of this suit 
to prevent certain persons from selling and/or transferring shares 
prior to the resolution of the action. Pursuant to the Court ys order, 
intervener Carl Anderson authenticated the 8-K. Anderson Affi, Rec. at 39, <[j 10. 
the aforementioned shares are to be deemed "restricted securities" and 
all certificates representing said share (sic) shall bear an appropriate 
restricted legend, (emphasis added). 
Rec. at 42.3 (A copy of the 8-K is also included as Exhibit B hereto). 
22. Although Medisys was telling the SEC (and the investing public) that 
it was the Utah trial court who had ordered the Interveners1 shares restricted, 
Medisys told the trial court in the Medisys complaint — verified by Edward 
Sutherland, Medisys' president, Rec. at 6 — that the shares were already restricted 
and indeed could not be sold at all: 
As the shares issued in connection with the reorganization, the 
transfer of which is sought to be enjoined herein are restricted and 
bear a restrictive legend preventing their sale and transfer, any bond 
supporting this injunction should be minimal. 
Rec. at 4, f 18. 
23. The shares, because they had not been registered with the SEC, indeed 
bore the standard "restricted" legend for unregistered shares.4 That legend did not 
The 8-K nowhere identifies the defendants in the Medisys Utah suit, leaving the 
clear, distinct, and wrong impression that Medisys had moved against the 
Interveners themselves in Utah and obtained relief. 
4
 "THE SECURITIES REPRESENTED HEREBY HAVE NOT BEEN 
REGISTERED UNDER THE UNITED STATES SECURITIES ACT OF 1933, 
AND MAY NOT BE SOLD, TRANSFERRED, ASSIGNED, PLEDGED OR 
HYPOTHECATED ABSENT AN EFFECTIVE REGISTRATION THEREOF 
UNDER SUCH ACT OR COMPLIANCE WITH AN AVAILABLE 
EXEMPTION FROM REGISTRATION. THE COMPANY MAY REFUSE 
TO AUTHORIZE ANY TRANSFER OF THE SECURITIES IN RELIANCE 
ON AN EXEMPTION FROM THE REGISTRATION UNTIL IT HAS 
(continued . . .) 
Q 
forbid the shares1 sale, but instead — as is the case with any unregistered shares — 
required an exemption to apply. 
24. The applicable exemption here is Rule 144 issued by the SEC under 
the 1933 Securities Act, 17 CFR 230.144. The Interveners are "affiliates" of 
Medisys as defined in Rule 144(a)(1) (ffAn affiliate of an issuer is a person that 
directly, or indirectly through one or more intermediaries, controls, or is controlled 
by, or is under common control with, such issuer."). 
25. Rule 144(e)(l)(i) permits an affiliate to sell, every 90 days, an amount 
of restricted shares that is not greater than "[o]ne percent of the shares or other 
units of the class outstanding as shown by the most recent report or statement 
published by the issuer." 
26. As Medisys and Interstate knew quite well, Interveners had sold stock 
under this exemption before, and had provided Interstate with Rule 144 opinions 
for these sales to proceed. Phillips Aff, Rec. at 27, j^ 4. An exemplar of such an 
opinion appears at Rec. at 35. See also infra, <[ffl 53 - 55 (Medisys' president 
testified in Interveners' Florida litigation that he knew the Interveners' shares could 
be sold). 
RECEIVED AN OPINION OF COUNSEL SATISFACTORY TO THE 
COMPANY AND ITS COUNSEL. THAT SUCH REGISTRATION IS NOT 
REQUIRED." 
Rec. at 29. 
n 
27. Under Rule 144, had the trial court not issued its injunction, each 
Intervener could have sold approximately 540,000 shares of that Intervener's 
Medisys stock during any given 90 day period. Phillips Aff, Rec. at 28, f 8; 
Anderson Affi, Rec. at 38, f 8, Morris Affi, Rec. at 51, \ 7. 
V. The Interveners Learn of the Injunction and Immediately Seek to 
Intervene in the Utah Lawsuit 
28. Medisys did not notify any of the Interveners that it was going to seek 
an injunction restraining the Interveners' sales of shares. Phillips Affi, Rec. at 26 -
27, Tf 3; Anderson Aff, Rec. at 37 - 38, \ 3; Morris Aff, Rec. at 5 1 4 3. 
29. The Interveners first learned of the injunction when one of them tried 
to sell shares, and received back from Interstate not a confirmation, but instead 
from Interstate a faxed copy of the injunction, sent July 10, 2000 (the injunction 
had issued June 28). Affidavit of Ronald Anderson, Rec. at 67, f^ 4; Affidavit of 
Barbara Larkin, Rec. at 25, ^ j 4. 
30. When the Interveners realized that they had been enjoined from 
selling shares, they filed, on July 28, 2000, an emergency motion to intervene in 
the Utah action and to dissolve the injunction, together with supporting affidavits 
and evidence. Rec. at 23 - 138. 
31. The trial court's clerk then called the Interveners' Utah counsel stating 
that the court had room on its calendar on August 2, 2000 to hear the emergency 
m 
motions. Transcript of August 2} 2000 Hearing on Motion to Dissolve ("August 2, 
2000 Trans.") at 1,1ns. 8-9 . 
32. Counsel for the Interveners and counsel for Interstate attended the 
hearing, but no one, including the court, could locate Medisys' local counsel. Id. at 
1,1ns. 12-15 at 2, Ins. 6- 18. 
33. In their motion to dissolve the injunction, Interveners argued that the 
case was a sham. 
34. Medisys rejoined in response, "Proposed interveners have complained 
that there was collusion between Plaintiff and Defendant. So what?" 
Memorandum in Response to Motion to Dissolve Injunction, Rec. at 150. 
VI. Once the Interveners Became Parties, the Trial Court Treated the 
Injunction as an Ex Parte Temporary Restraining Order Against them. 
35. At the August 2 hearing, the trial court noted that while Medisys and 
Interstate had stipulated to the relief sought, the Interveners1 claim put matters in a 
new light: 
This order is entirely appropriate, and it is durable. This is a 
stipulated temporary restraining order between these parties whose 
names appear on the caption. Nothing wrong with this. This is fine. 
It didn't have to dissolve with ten days. It could exist in perpetuity, 
and no one would complain, and nobody on the fifth floor, given the 
opportunity, would disturb it. 
It's not until you present a claim that I recognize for intervention that 
any kind of problem arises . . . . 
August 2, 2000 Trans, at 6, Ins. 11-19. 
36. Once the Interveners were in the case, the order unquestionably 
became an ex parte TRO against them: 
More likely than not, I'm going to grant the motion to intervene. 
Here's the practical consequence of that. It is that the Interveners are 
going to be parties defendant who are subject to an ex-parte TRO. 
What that means is that they're in a position where they can request a 
preliminary injunction hearing, or a hearing on the TRO, within 48 
hours. So that is the right, I guess, that I'm recognizing here this 
afternoon and the way I'm treating this. 
August 2, 2000 Trans, at 5, Ins. 5-13. 
37. The trial court set August 4 as the hearing date for the Interveners' 
motion to dissolve the TRO. See also id. at 7, Ins. 3 - 5 (noting that if plaintiffs 
counsel had a problem with a hearing on two days' notice, "well, quite frankly it 
kind of goes with the territory of ex-parte temporary restraining orders.") 
38. The court specifically noted that an evidentiary hearing would be 
required, and allotted two and a half hours. August 2, 2000 Trans, at 7, Ins. 14 -
20. See also id. at 7, In. 17 (Interstate's counsel agreeing that hearing would be 
evidentiary). 
39. This put the Interveners in a bind, because the Interveners' chief 
argument was that the Utah injunction was a subterfuge engaged in by Medisys to 
avoid having to litigate the injunction issues directly with the Interveners in 
Louisiana, and thus that the injunction should be immediately dissolved and 
Medisys directed to seek relief, if at all, in Louisiana. 
40. The trial court acknowledged this problem, but could do little to 
assuage it: 
You're facing a dilemma because you think that this matter ought to 
be heard in Louisiana, and you don't want to assei ible witnesses and 
prepare a case for Friday in Salt Lake City, something that I respect. 
And here I'm speculating about what you're going to tell me because I 
don't want you to tell me your position on this because Leedy's not 
here. 
Mr. Dykes: Right. 
The Court: Without him, I don't want to weigh in. My point is, you'd 
better put chips on both the red and the black, and you'd better be 
ready to cover both of those on Friday. And for all I know, I may say 
go to Louisiana. So you'd better explain to your witnesses that they 
may be here for naught, but on the other hand, we may end up having 
a hearing. 
August 2, 2000 Trans, at 8, Ins. 10-23. 
41. The parties, Interveners (and Medisys) included, thus had no choice 
but to get ready for a full evidentiary hearing on August 4. Although the record of 
appearances does not reflect his attendance, August 4, 2000 Transcript, the 
Interveners' lead counsel (Mr. Spencer) flew in for the hearing. Mr. Dykes, the 
Interveners' local counsel, appeared as well. Two of the Interveners, Carl 
Anderson and William Morris, were ready to testify. 
42. Medisys1 lead counsel (Mr. Ward) flew in with Medisys' witnesses, 
including Mr. Sutherland. Medisys1 local counsel (Mr. Leedy) also attended. 
43. Interveners' issued a subpoena to Medisys' accountants (after the 
Court granted Interveners' emergency motion to shorten time for a response, Rec. 
at 145), exhibits were arranged, and general trial preparation undertaken. 
44. Instead of holding the anticipated evidentiary hearing, however, the 
trial court took oral argument from the parties on whether the issues then at bar 
should be heard in Louisiana. Transcript of August 4, 2000 Hearing ("August 4 
Trans"), passim. 
45. At the conclusion of the August 4 hearing, the trial court continued 
the injunction for 10 days, and directed Medisys, if it wished further relief, to seek 
an injunction against the Interveners in the Louisiana action. August 4 Trans, at 
17, Ins. 20-24. 
46. Medisys did not obtain a Louisiana injunction within the 10 day 
period, whereupon the trial court granted a brief extension. 
47. Although the court did not execute the formal order directing the same 
until September 11, 2000, Rec. at 238, the court ultimately ordered in open court 
that the injunction would dissolve permanently on August 22, 2000. 
VII. The Florida Testimony. 
48. On September 7, 2000, Rec. at 225, after the injunction had dissolved, 
Medisys filed a motion to release the $5,000 bond, arguing that the Interveners had 
suffered no damage from the injunction. 
49. Interveners objected, Rec. at 243, arguing that they were going to file 
2. motion for fees and costs from being wrongfully enjoined, and that the bond 
should remain in place pending resolution of the same. 
50. As noted earlier, the Interveners had filed a lawsuit in Florida against 
Medisys' officers alleging misdeeds with the company. 
51. An injunction hearing came up in the Florida case in the middle of the 
injunction battle in Utah. Although Medisysf officers never testified in Utah, they 
did testify, in response to the Interveners1 counsel's questions, in Florida about the 
Utah injunction. 
52. In their objection to release of the bond, the Interveners were able to 
provide this testimony to the Utah court as a preview of their argument for fees. 
53. As the Interveners showed in that objection, Mr. Sutherland of 
Medisys testified in Florida that he knew the Interveners' shares could be sold in 
private under Rule 144. Rec. at 246 - 247.5 
5The record citations contained above are to the briefs where Interveners quoted 
the Florida testimony. The Florida testimony itself appears at Rec. 253 - 269 
(continued . . .) 
54. Mr. Sutherland said that he knew little about Rule 144, yet Mr. Kiesel, 
a Medisys lawyer, testified that Mr. Sutherland had himself sold shares under Rule 
144. Rec. at247n.3. 
55. While Medisys told the trial court below that the Interveners' shares 
had been "cancelled,'1 and an injunction was needed so that Medisys would not 
have to honor the sale of dead shares, Mr. Sutherland testified in Floric a that the 
shares had not been cancelled "in commerce." Rec. at 248. 
56. Mr. Kiesel confirmed that no court had adjudged the shares to be 
cancelled. Rec. at 249. 
57. The Florida court asked Mr. Sutherland how Medisys could tell the 
Utah court that a bond of only $5,000 was required for the Utah injunction, when 
Medisys knew that the Interveners had sold, and could sell, stock in excess of that 
amount, and asked further whether Mr. Sutherland believe that the Utah court had 
been misled. Rec. at 247. 
58. Mr. Sutherland opined that the Utah court had not been misled. Id. 
VIII. Medisys' Louisiana Case is Dismissed because of a Forum Selection 
Clause; Medisys Refiles in the United States District Court for the 
District of Utah and Loses its Motion for a Preliminary Injunction. 
("Transcript of Preliminary Injunction Hearing, August 17, 2000, E. Carl Anderson 
v. Kiesel, United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida, Case No. 
8:00-CV-905-4-24F"). 
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59. While all this was going on in Utah, the Interveners were arguing in 
Louisiana that Medisys' lawsuit against the Interveners in that state had to be 
dismissed, because the merger agreement pursuant to which the Interveners 
obtained the Medisys shares had a choice of law provision requiring suit to be 
brought in Utah. 
60. The Louisiana court agreed, and dismissed the Louisiana case without 
prejudice. Rec. at 298. 
61. Medisys then refiled its case against the Interveners, this time in the 
United States District Court for the District of Utah. 
62. While Medisys had represented to the Utah state court, in the 
complaint initiating this action, that Interstate could not be sued in Louisiana 
because jurisdiction over it did not obtain there, Rec. at 3, § 13,6 Medisys did not 
join Interstate to its Utah federal court suit, where jurisdiction indisputably existed, 
but instead sued the Interveners directly. 
63. In its new Utah federal court suit, Medisys sought an injunction 
against Interveners1 sale of stock. The Interveners stipulated to a brief injunction 
so that the parties could focus their attention on preparing for an evidentiary 
6A highly dubious proposition, given that Interstate was Medisys1 agent for the 
transfer of stock, and Medisys was subject to Louisiana's jurisdiction. 
hearing (held September 10 and 11, Rec. at 380) on Medisys' motion for a 
preliminary injunction. 
64. At the conclusion of that hearing, the Utah federal court denied 
Medisys' motion for a preliminary injunction and dissolved the injunction stopping 
the Interveners' sales of shares, finding, Rec. at 380, that Medisys had not shown a 
substantial likelihood that it would prevail on the merits. 
IX. Interveners File a Motion for Fees and Costs; the Trial Court Rules that 
the Injunction was Wrongful. 
65. On October 12, 2000, the Interveners filed a motion for fees and costs 
incurred in their efforts to dissolve the Utah injunction. Rec. at 310. The matter 
was extensively briefed. 
66. Therein, Interveners noted that: 
(a) The lawsuit was a sham, undertaken by Medisys and Interstate in Utah 
to avoid going through the proper procedures for seeking injunctive 
relief against the Interveners; 
(b) The Medisys Florida testimony — coupled with the 8-K — showed that 
Medisys knew the Interveners were entitled do sell their shares, and 
that the shares had not in fact been "cancelled"; 
(c) Medisys claimed it could not sue Interstate in the Louisiana action 
because jurisdiction did not obtain there, yet Medisys did not sue 
Interstate when it brought its federal case in Utah (where jurisdiction 
indisputably existed), thus emphasizing that Interstate was a straw-
man; 
(d) OWhen the actual merits between Medisys and the Interveners were 
put in issue before the Utah federal district court, the court found that 
1 O 
Medisys had not shown a substantial likelihood of success on the 
merits of Medisys' substantive claims and denied relief. 
67. Oral argument on the motion for fees was held on January 19, 2001, at 
the conclusion of which the trial court ruled: 
[W]as the injunction wrongful? Answer, yes, the injunction was 
wrongful. It was a collusive action. The transfer agent had, as we're 
coming to the last hours of the Clinton administration we can use 
these for the last time, had no dog in this fight, and it had no interest 
to serve other than the interest of Medisys in my view. And that there 
is no interpretation of the intent of the complaint available other than 
the interpretation that the interveners were the intended target of the 
relief. Do the interveners have available to them the opportunity to 
seek and recover relief for wrongful injunction? Answer, yes. If for 
no other reason than the general equitable powers of a Court that flow 
from injunction relief authority and relief general. 
Would I having been armed with what I know now about the character 
of the stock, it's (sic) status as 144 stock, the nature of the Louisiana 
action, have granted this injunction? The short answer is no way. It 
never would happen. And based on that finding I am granting the 
motion by the interveners to recover attorney's fees. 
Transcript of January 19, 2001 Hearing ("January 19 Trans.") at 36, Ins. 5 - 23. 
X. The Trial Court Grants Medisys the Opportunity for an Evidentiary 
Hearing on Fees; Medisys Declines. 
68. At the conclusion of the January 19, 2001 hearing, the trial court 
explicitly recognized, January 19 Trans, at 37, Ins. 5 - 5, a party's right under Utah 
law to request an evidentiary hearing on the amount of fees to be awarded, and 
thus extended to Medisys "ten days with which, in which to file papers challenging 
reasonableness and, if they so desire, to include within those papers a request for 
hearing/1 January 19 Trans, at 37, Ins. 9-12. 
69. The court's subsequent order, issued, February 6, 2001, Rec. at 456, ^ j 
3, thus provided that: 
Within 10 days of January 19, 2001, Medisys may file an objection to 
the amount of fees requested by the Interveners. Medisys may 
request, in such objection, if one is file, an evidentiary hearing on the 
reasonableness of the fees requested. 
70. In its subsequent "Supplemental Brief on the Reasonableness of 
Interveners' Request for Fees," Rec. at 430, Medisys acknowledged the trial court's 
prior instruction that objections were to be filed within ten days, nowhere 
requested a hearing, and instead relied on the affidavit of Mr. Ward, Medisys' 
counsel, to rebut the amount of fees sought. 
71. Interveners noted on the first page of their response in support of their 
motion for fees, Rec. at 443, that Medisys had declined the trial court's invitation to 
request an evidentiary hearing, that the Interveners likewise were not requesting a 
hearing, and thus the matter could be resolved on the papers. 
72. Medisys said nothing in response. 
on 
XL The Amount of Fees Sought. 
73. According to the Medisys 8-K, the injunction restrained the sale of 
13,500,000 shares of stock. 
74. In connection with — on an expedited basis — learning the facts of the 
case, drafting the motion to intervene, complaint in intervention, motion and 
supporting memorandum (a comp ex document) to dissolve the injunction, and in 
preparation for what the court had said could be a serious evidentiary hearing, Mr. 
Dykes applied, Rec. at 383, for a total of 73.90 hours of work at $240.00 per hour 
for a total of $17,736. All time was itemized. Id. at 384 - 85. (Medisys did not 
challenge counsels' hourly rates). 
75. Mr. Spencer applied for 65.55 hours at $200 an hour for a total of 
$13,110, and, as did Mr. Dykes, submitted an affidavit and itemized time. Rec. at 
386-388 (affidavit), at 389 - 90 (time charges). Mr. Spencer's work was likewise 
informed by a sense of urgency, as shown by his time entries, given that a response 
to an ex parte TRO was at issue. 
76. Because the original affidavits of Messrs. Dykes and Spencer were 
done before the January 19 hearing on the motion for fees was held, counsel filed, 
after the trial court determined to award fees, supplemental affidavits detailing the 
time spent preparing for the fee hearing itself. Rec. at 459. 
77. Mr. Dykes itemized 10.90 hours, for a total of $2,616, spent on the fee 
hearing. Rec. at 471 - 72. 
78. Mr. Spencer itemized 44.80 hours (including travel time) at $200.00 
for a total of 8,960.00, plus travel expenses (which the trial court ultimately 
disallowed). Rec. at 469 - 70. 
79. In his supplemental affidavit, Mr. Spencer also responded to the 
objections made by Medisys' counsel, Mr. Ward, to the amount of fees sought in 
the Interveners' original fee application. Rec. at 462 - 68. 
XII. The Court's Initial Fee Award and Subsequent Clarification. 
80. In an April 2, 2001 minute ruling, Exhibit C hereto, the trial court 
issued an award: 
Intervenor's (sic) Motion for Award of Fees was presented to me for 
decision pursuant to a Notice to Submit filed on March 8, 2001. I 
have previously determined that the intervenor is entitled to an award 
of attorney's fees in connection with its defense of the above-
captioned action for injunctive relief. I now find that the amount of 
attorney's fees sought by the intervenor, $30,846, is reasonable in light 
of the complexity of the litigation. I further find the hourly rates 
charged by intervenor's counsel to be reasonable. I reject plaintiffs 
contention that the activities of Mr. Dykes and Mr. Spencer were 
excessive in light of the issues presented. Lastly, I reject the 
contention that the fee application was inflated by double billing. 
Rec. at 475. 
81. This minute ruling, however, did not refer one way or the other to the 
Intervener's supplemental affidavits, in which they itemized the amount of time 
oo 
spent in connection with the final work done on the fee issue, including the 
hearing. 
82. Interveners thus moved, Rec. at 478, for clarification of the fee award, 
to find out whether the trial court had considered and denied the request for the 
remaining fees, or had simply overlooked that request. 
83. Medisys, which by then had new local counsel, Rec. at 473, fikd a 
"Response to Interveners' Motion to Clarify Fee Award," Rec. at 497, in which 
Medisys not only opposed the award for fees expended in connection with the fee 
hearing, but further argued — despite the fact that Medisys had already had its 
opportunity to object to amounts and the trial court had already ruled on the initial 
fee application — that no fees should be awarded for anything. 
84. In their "Reply Memorandum of Defendant Interveners in Support of 
Motion for Clarification, Rec. at 524, Interveners pointed out that Medisys' 
objection was really a disguised motion for reconsideration of the court's initial fee 
award, that Medisys had already made its objections, had lost, and had offered no 
reason for reconsidering what had already been decided. 
85. In a June 18, 2001 minute entry, Exhibit D hereto, the trial court 
ruled: 
Intervenor's Motion for Clarification was presented to me for 
decision pursuant to a Notice to Submit filed on May 10, 2001. My 
review of the file confirms the intervenor's observation that I 
overlooked the intervenor's application for fees associated with 
intervenor's application for a fee award. I reject the argument 
advanced by Medisys that Rule 65A does not authorize fee awards of 
this nature. I decline, however, to award fees associated with travel 
time and travel expenses. 
I decline to accept Medisys' invitation to revisit my original fee 
determination. 
Intervenor's counsel shall prepare an Order consistent with this 
Minute Entry. 
Rec. at 535. 
86. Interveners subtracted the disallowed fees and costs from the amount 
sought, and submitted an order for $36,321.80, which the court signed. Rec. at 
557. 
XIII. The First Appeal. 
87. Medisys then applied to the trial court for approval of a supersedeas 
bond in the amount of fees awarded ($36,321.80). 
88. The Interveners timely objected, Rec. at 574, on the grounds, inter 
alia, that the bond did not include amounts for fees to be incurred upon appeal. 
89. Although the Interveners' objection to the bond was timely, the trial 
court signed an order approving the bond before the Interveners' objection was 
filed. Rec. at 548. 
90. The Interveners moved for reconsideration, Rec. at 579, on the 
grounds that the trial court had approved the bond before the Interveners' objection 
was ruled upon. 
91. The trial court then issued a minute ruling acknowledging that it had 
approved the bond before Interveners' time to object had expired, and directing 
Medisys to increase the bond to the amount of $59,000 to reflect attorney's fees on 
appeal. 
92. Medisys complied, Rec. at 616, and then appealed the fee order. 
93. Intervener moved to dismiss the appeal on the grounds that the trial 
court had never dismissed the underlying case, and that the fee award could not be 
appealed until the case was over. 
94. Medisys (who had retained new local counsel again), agreed that the 
appeal filed by prior counsel was premature, and this Court then dismissed. 
95. On December 1, 2003, the Hon. Anthony Quinn, who had taken over 
the case after Judge Nehring's appointment to the Utah Supreme Court, dismissed 
the underlying case without prejudice. Rec. at 684. 
96. Medisys then appealed. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
Medisys obtained an ex parte temporary restraining order, the effect of 
which was to restrain the Inverveners from selling Medisys' shares. The 
Interveners successfully moved to dissolve that order, and then sought fees. 
The trial court properly found that Medisys had failed to disclose material 
facts when it sought the injunction, that the injunction was wrongful, and that the 
court would award fees and costs to the Interveners, both under Utah Rule Civ. P. 
65 A(c) and pursuant to the court's inherent power. 
Interveners supported their fee applications with itemized affidavits. The 
trial court properly exercised its discretion in considering the amounts awarded. 
ARGUMENT 
I. 
Standards Governing Fees and Costs. 
"The Utah Rules of Civil Procedure allow a wrongfully restrained party to 
recover attorney fees incurred in connection with a temporary retraining order or 
injunction." Green River Canal Co. v. Thayn, 84 P.3d 1134 (Utah 2003) (citing 
Utah R.Civ.P. 65A(c)(2)). Although the enjoined party is not entitled "to fees 
incurred in litigating the underlying lawsuit associated with an injunction," Tholen 
v. Sandy City, 849 P.2d 592, 597 (Utah App. 1993), here, the entire case was the 
injunction. 
Moreover, 
The amount of attorney fees and expenses recovered may not be 
limited by the bond posted, as Rule 65A(c) (2) expressly mandates: 
"The amount of security shall not establish or limit the amount of 
costs, including reasonable attorney fees incurred in connection with 
the restraining order . . . . or damages that may be awarded to a party 
who is found to have been wrongfully restrained or enjoined." 
Green River Canal Co., 84 P.3d at 1148 n. 11. 
O/C 
An injunction is wrongful "if is finally determined that the applicant was not 
entitled to the injunction." Mountain States Tel & Tel. v. Atkin, Wright & Mills, 
681 P.2d 1258, 1262 (Utah 1984). "[T]he test is not whether the injunction is 
erroneous on its face, but whether it is later determined that the restraint was 
erroneous in the sense that it would not have been ordered had the court been 
presented all of the facts.'" Knappet v. Locke, 600 P.2d 1257, 125) (Wash. 1979) 
(internal citation omitted). See also Tholen v. Sandy City, supra, 849 P.2d at 597 
(citing Knappet approvingly). The trial court made those precise findings: 
[W]as the injunction wrongful? Answer, yes, the injunction was 
wrongful. It was a collusive action.[7] The transfer agent had, as 
we're coming to the last hours of the Clinton administration we can 
use these for the last time, had no dog in this fight, and it had no 
interest to serve other than the interest of Medisys in my view 
Would I having been armed with what I know now about the character 
of the stock, it's (sic) status as 144 stock, the nature of the Louisiana 
action, have granted this injunction? The short answer is no way. It 
never would happen. And based on that finding I am granting the 
motion by the interveners to recover attorney's fees. 
January 19 Tram, at 36. 
7As we have seen, Medisys agrees ("Proposed interveners have complained that 
there was collusion between Plaintiff and Defendant. So what?"). Rec. at 150. 
One big "so what" is that the "lawsuit" was never justiciable to begin with. See 
Gould v. Control Laser Corp., 866 F.2d 1391, 1394 (Fed. Cir. 1989) ("The fact 
that seemingly adverse parties appear on two sides of an action is not controlling. 
If one party is actually and formally in control of the other party, adjudication must 
be refused."). 
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II. 
Rule 65A Governed these Proceedings. 
According to Medisys, the injunction at bar — as between Medisys and 
Interstate, both of whom stipulated to the relief sought — was a final judgment on 
the merits, to which Rule 65A (which governs preliminary relief) was irrelevant. 
Medisys' Brief on Appeal at 10 - 12. Thus, Medisys concludes, Rule 65 A did not 
provide a basis to award fees and costs. That argument comes at the expense of 
what actually happened in this case. 
Medisys and the Interveners were embroiled in litigation in Louisiana. 
Medisys — as it said in the 8-K that it filed with the Securities and Exchange 
Commission — wanted, in connection with the Louisiana suit, to stop the 
Interveners from selling shares. But instead of seeking preliminary injunctive 
relief against the Interveners in Louisiana — a process that most assuredly would 
have been governed by Fed.R.Civ.P. 65(a), which is identical to Utah R. Civ.P. 
65A — Medisys and Interstate filed a collusive lawsuit in Utah, stipulating to an 
injunction against the Interveners but never giving them notice of the same.8 
8Medisys of course knew how to find the Interveners, yet gave no notice to them 
that it was seeking a Utah injunction stopping all sales of the Interveners' stock. 
This plainly violated Utah R.Civ.P. 65A(b)(l): 
No temporary restraining order shall be granted without notice to the 
adverse party or that party's attorney unless (A) it clearly appears from 
(continued ...) 
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When Medisys' Louisiana suit was dismissed, and Medisys refiled the case 
in the United States District Court for the District of Utah, Medisys did not even 
join Interstate, but instead sought injunctive relief directly against the Interveners 
under Fed.R.Civ.P. 65. 
In light of the facts, it is thus indeed difficult to see how Medisys can 
advance the following argument: 
Interveners were not a party when the injunction issued, and were not 
actually "restrained or enjoined" themselves, as Rule 65A(c)(2) 
requires. The injunction prevented the transfer agent, Interstate 
Transfer, from registering transfers of certain certificates. The shares 
owned by Interveners could still be sold by them. If Interveners 
prevailed in their collateral litigation with Medisys, or obtained 
appropriate interim relief in that litigation, Medisys, as issuer of the 
shares, could have been require to order its transfer agent to register 
the transfer. 
Medisys' Brief on Appeal, at 13.9 
specific facts shown by affidavit or by the verified complaint that 
immediate and irreparable injury, loss, or damage will result to the 
applicant before the adverse party or that party's attorney can be heard 
in opposition, and (B) the applicant or the applicant's attorney certifies 
to the court in writing as to the efforts, if any, that have been made to 
give notice and the reasons supporting the claim that notice should not 
be required. 
9In its "Conditional Consent to Intervention and Request for Hearing," Rec. at 20, 
Medisys made a similar argument: 
The case is over. Proposed interveners' rights are specifically not 
affected by the Injunction. It was envisioned that that proposed 
interveners would commence a new action to compel transfer of their 
(continued . . .) 
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The Interveners were enjoined. The trial court so found ("there is no 
interpretation of the intent of the complaint available other than the interpretation 
that the interveners were the intended target of the relief). As Medisys stated — 
indeed, promoted — in its 8-K filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission, 
the Interveners' shares could not be sold once the injunction issued, which was the 
very goal of the enterprise from the outset. 
The only reason the Interveners "were not a party when the injunction 
issued" is because Medisys, in its desire to avoid the rigors of proper injunction 
practice in Louisiana, did not join them.l0 Medisys is estopped from relying on its 
own subterfuge to now claim that the rules it sought to skirt do not apply. 
stock wherein this action could not be raised as res adjudicata. 
The Interveners' rights were affected by the injunction. As Medisys itself told the 
SEC, that was the whole point. Medisys' purported "remedy" — that the 
Interveners could sue Medisys somewhere else to force it to tell Interstate to 
transfer shares — defies reason. 
10Medisys continually implied below that the Interveners were hypocritical in 
arguing to the Utah court that it should not have issued the injunction, while at the 
same time arguing in Louisiana that the Louisiana lawsuit should have been 
brought in Utah because of the forum clause. The point, of course, is that no 
matter where the federal court case was pending, Medisys improperly brought a 
separate action in Utah state court seeking the entry of an ex parte TRO against the 
Interveners. 
The situation is no different than it would have been had Medisys originally 
filed its federal court action against the Interveners in the United States District 
Court for the District of Utah, and then walked over one block to the Matheson 
(continued . . .) 
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III. 
Even if Rule 65A did not Apply, the Court Regardless had the Inherent 
Power to Award Fees. 
Even "in the absence of a statutory or contractual authorization, a court has 
inherent equitable power to award reasonable attorney fees when it deems it 
appropriate in the interests of justice and equity." Ste\ >art v. Utah Public Service 
Commission, 885 P.2d 759, 782 (Utah 1994). See also Rohan v. Boseman, 46 P.3d 
753, 759 (Utah App. 2002) (citing Stewart and affirming award of fees and costs 
based on trial court's "'inherent authority to govern judicial proceedings and make 
appropriate sanctions . . . . ' " ) 
Stewart and its progeny permit an award of fees not only in "private attorney 
general actions," but in a host of other contexts involving untoward conduct. 
Rohan, 46 P.3d at 755.n The trial court clearly understood this, taking care to note 
in its oral ruling that it was invoking the "general equitable powers of a Court that 
flow from injunction relief authority and relief general." 
And the trial court just as clearly made known its displeasure at what had 
happened, itemizing the fact that the "lawsuit" was collusive, with Interstate being 
Courthouse to file its state court "lawsuit" against Interstate, seeking — without 
notice to them — to enjoin the Interveners from selling shares in aid of the federal 
action. Indeed, that example perhaps puts into even clearer focus the impropriety 
of Medisys' actions. 
uMedisys Brief at 10. Faust v. KAI Tech.} Inc. , 15 P.3d 1266 (Utah App. 2000). 
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a straw-man defendant, that Medisys had failed to disclose that the stock could be 
sold under Rule 144 (contrary to Medisys1 claim in the complaint that the court's 
order would have no real effect because the stock allegedly could not be 
transferred), and that Medisys had further failed to disclose that the injunction was 
an end-around the Louisiana litigation. These are ample grounds upon which the 
court could exercise its inherent equitable powers to award fees. 
IV. 
Medisys Declined the Trial Court's Invitation to an Evidentiary Hearing on 
the Amount of Fees Awarded, and Cannot be Heard to Complain Now. 
Medisys assigns "reversible error" because instead of allegedly "weighing" 
the affidavits on the amount of fees to be awarded, the trial court "should have held 
an evidentiary hearing to resolve the conflicting factual assertions as to the 
reasonableness and necessity of fees." Medisys Brief dX 15. Medisys was given the 
chance for a hearing and declined it, Statement of Facts fflf 68 - 72, deciding 
instead to proceed solely on the basis of affidavits. Medisys cannot assign error 
when it expressly sent regrets to the trial court's invitation (Interveners neither 
believe nor concede that an evidentiary hearing would have made any difference). 
V. 
The Trial Court did not Abuse its Discretion in the Amount of Fees Awarded. 
The trial court has broad discretion in determining what constitutes a 
reasonable attorney fee once it has been determined that a party is 
legally entitled to a fee award, and we will not reverse a trial court's 
determination of whether a fee is reasonable absent an abuse of 
discretion. In addition, we review a trial court's calculation of 
reasonable attorney fees for an abuse of discretion. 
Bakowski v. Mountain States Steel Inc., 52 P.3d 1179, 1188 (Utah 2002). See also 
Dixie State Bank v. Bracken, 764 P.2d 985, 991 (Utah 1998) (once a trial court 
decides that a fee is reasonable, "it commits legal error if it awards less than the 
reasonable fee to which the successful litigant is entitled."). 
Although the precise issued addressed by the court (whether expert expenses 
are awardable) is not at issue here, the Utah Supreme Court has recently suggested 
that Rule 65(A)(c) be given an expansive reading: 
We see no rationale for allowing recovery of attorney fees but 
denying other litigation expenses. The use of costs and damages in 
Rule 65A(c) has always been interpreted more broadly than traditional 
limitations on the term "costs." Like attorney fees, these were costs 
incurred as a direct result of a wrongful enjoiner. We therefore find 
that Rule 65A(c) is sufficiently broad to include recover of the 
litigation expenses sought by GRCC. 
Green River Canal Co. v. Thayn, 84 P.3d 1134, 1148. 
Counsel itemized the time spent responding to the crises that Medisys and 
Interstate created. As set forth in counsels' affidavits, a number of pleadings and 
memoranda had to be drafted in short order. Statement of Facts, ffif 74 - 79. Even 
though the August 4 hearing ended up taking less than one hour and was handled 
solely on the basis of oral argument, counsel was expressly told by the trial court 
on August 2 to make full preparations for an evidentiary hearing on August 4 just 
in case. Statement of Facts, f 40. This was a tremendous undertaking. Counsel 
for both sides had to prepare their witnesses. Mr. Ward, Medisys1 lead counsel, 
appeared at the August 4 hearing, as did Mr. Leedy, Medisys' local counsel. Mr. 
Spencer, Interveners' lead counsel, appeared, as did Mr. Dykes. 
Medisys did not challenge below the hourly rates at issue, but only the hours 
spent. The trial court — which had first-hand experience with the case — exercised 
proper care in reviewing these amounts: 
I now find that the amount of attorney's fees sought by the 
intervenor, $30,846, is reasonable in light of the complexity of the 
litigation. I further find the hourly rates charged by intervenor's 
counsel to be reasonable. I reject plaintiffs contention that the 
activities of Mr. Dykes and Mr. Spencer were excessive in light of the 
issues presented. Lastly, I reject the contention that the fee 
application was inflated by double billing. 
VI. 
The Trial Court Properly Awarded the Interveners their Fees Expended on 
the Fee Award Itself. 
Fee awards properly include fees expended in preparing the underlying fee 
request. Brown v. Richards & Co., 978 P.2d 470, 476 (Utah App. 1999). See also 
Salmon v. Davis County, 916 P.2d 890 (1996) (general discussion of issue and 
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cases).12 Contrary to Medisys' claim, Medisys' Brief on Appeal at 15 - 16, there is 
no requirement that the underlying statute or doctrine permit such an award. 
Indeed, the "fees for fee" rule is intended to fill gaps in fee statutes, in order to 
ensure that the full purpose of a fee statute is thereby realized. Salmon, 916 P.2d at 
895 - 96 (citing this Court's opinion in Jcmes Constructors v. Salt Lake City, 888 
P.2d 665, 674 (Utah App. 1994).13 
The trial court (after acknowledging, Statement of Facts, \ 85, that it had 
initially overlooking that portion of the Interveners1 fee request) awarded the 
Interveners a portion of the fees they incurred in preparing their papers for a fee 
award. In its award, the trial court declined to award fees for Mr. Spencer's travel 
time or to award Mr. Spencer's travel expenses. Interveners do not challenge that 
ruling now. The award of fees for fees was proper. 
nAccord, Clark v. City of Los Angeles, 803 F.2d 987, 992 (9th Cir. 1986) 
(addressing issue of "Fees for Fee Motions" in 1983 case and affirming award for 
time spent "for counsel's work on his own fee petitions."); General Federation of 
Women's Clubs v. Iron Gate Inn, Inc., 537 A.2d 1123, 1129 (D.C. App. 1988) 
(addressing issue in context of bad faith litigation; "The law is well established 
that, when fees are available to the prevailing party, that party may also be 
awarded fees on fees, i.e., the reasonable expenses incurred in the recovery of its 
original costs and fees."). 
13If the underlying statute or doctrine permitting an award of fees also explicitly 
allowed "fees for fees," there would of course be no need to litigate the issue of 
whether such fees are awardable. 
VII. 
Interveners are Entitled to their Fees on Appeal 
A party that is awarded fees "pursuant to a contract or statute" is also 
entitled to fees on appeal if that party succeeds. Zoll & Branch, P.C. v. Asay, 932 
P.2d 592, 596 (Utah 1997). See also Brown v. Richards, 840 P.2d 143, 156 (Utah 
App. 1993) ("The general rule is that when a party who received attorney fees 
below prevails on appeal, the party is also entitled to fees reasonably incurred on 
appeal."). If Interveners prevail on appeal, they are entitled to an award of fees 
expended in that effort. 
CONCLUSION 
The trial court's award of fees and costs should be affirmed, and this case 
remanded for a determination of the Interveners' attorney's fees on appeal. 
DATED this/ i^day of July, 2004 
" ^ & MACRAE, LLP 
By: 
Mark W. Dykes 
Counsel for Interveners/Appellees 
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I hereby certify that two (2) copies of the foregoing were served this 12th 
day of July, 2004, by placing same in the United States first class mail, postage 
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David W. Scofield 
Peters Scofield Price 
340 Broadway Centre 
111 East Broadway 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
John Michael Coombs 
Mabey & Coombs, L.C. 
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EXHIBIT A 
Rule 65A UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDUKE 
(CXS) Jurisdiction over » ^ ^ ^ ' j 3 & S £ * ^ n u £ 
this rule submits to the J ^ ^ n ^ e ~
 y papers affecting the surety's 
clerk of the court as agent^upon ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ . ^ ^ 
liability on the bond or ^ j £ o u t t h | n e c essi ty of an independent action. The 
be enforced ^ ^ J ^ *ice 0f t h e motion as the court prescribes may be served on 
the^lerk^f the court who shall forthwith mail copies to the persons giving the 
security if their addresses are known. 
(d) Form and scope. Every restraining order and order granting an injunc-
tion shall set forth the reasons for its issuance. It shall be specific in terms and 
shall describe in reasonable detail, and not by reference to the complaint or 
other document, the act or acts sought to be restrained. It shall be binding only 
upon the parties to the action, their officers, agents, servants, employees, and 
attorneys, and upon those persons in active concert or participation with them 
who receive notit e, in person or through counsel, or otherwise, of the order. If 
a restraining ord r^ is pan ted without notice to the party restrained, it shall 
state the reasons justifying the court's decision to proceed without notice. 
(e) Grounds. A restraining order or preliminary injunction may issue only 
upon a showing by the applicant that: 
(e)(1) The applicant will suffer irreparable harm unless the order or 
injunction issues; 
(e)(2) The threatened injury to the applicant outweighs whatever damage 
the proposed order or injunction may cause the party restrained or enjoined; 
(e)(3) The order or injunction, if issued, would not be adverse to the public 
interest; and 
(e)(4) There is a substantial likelihood that the applicant will prevail on the 
merits of the underlying claim, or the case presents serious issues on the 
merits which should be the subject of further litigation. 
(f) Domestic relations cases. Nothing in this rule shall be construed to limit 
the equitable powers of the courts in domestic relations cases. 
(Amended effective September 1, 1991.) 
Advisory Committee Note. — Rule 65A Paragraph (b). This paragraph is similar to 
has been materially revised from the former paragraph (b) of the former rule. It has been 
rule. Some of the changes in the rule are the reorganized for clarity and has been modern-
result of suggestions from Utah's judges, all of ized in other respects. Subparagraph (1) pro-
whom were asked for their comments on spe- hibits the issuance of a temporary restraining 
cific ways to improve injunction practice. Al- order unless two conditions are met. First, as in 
though most paragraphs have been changed, the former rule, the record must disclose that 
there are two major revisions. First, under irreparable injury, loss, or damage will result if 
paragraph (b) of the present rule, the court now the court does not intervene. Second, the appli-
has explicit authority to order the consolidation cant or the applicant's attorney must provide 
of trial on the merits with the hearing on a written certification of any effort to give notice 
preliminary injunction. Second, the grounds for and the reasons for which notice should not be 
the issuance of temporary restraining orders required. The latter requirement is new. The 
and preliminary injunctions have been modern- language in subparagraphs (3) and (4) has been 
ized and clarified in paragraph (e). Portions of modernized and clarified, 
the rule have been reorganized for purposes of Paragraph (c). This paragraph has been re-
clarity, vised to reflect developments in the case law 
Paragraph (a). Subparagraph (a)(1) is iden- and a new rule in this state on damages for 
tical to paragraph (a) of the former rule. It is wrongfully issued injunctions. Subparagraph 
also identical to the corresponding subpara- (1) makes it clear that the court may decline to 
graph in Rule 65, Federal Rules of Civil Proce- require security if it appears that none of the 
dure. Subparagraph (a)(2) is entirely new to the parties will suffer expense or damages from a 
Utah rules. It is borrowed from subparagraph wrongful temporary restraining order or pre-
(a)(2) of the federal rule. It allows the court, in liminary injunction, or if, in the particular case, 
its discretion, to adjudicate the entire case at there is some other substantial reason for dis-
the time of the preliminary injunction hearing. pensing with the requirement of security. See 
If the court decides not to consolidate the trial Corporation of President of Church of Jesus 
on the merits with the preliminary injunction Christ of Latter-Day Saints v. Wallace, 573 P.2d 
hearing, admissible evidence received at the 1285, 1286-87 (Utah 1978). Otherwise, the 
preliminary injunction hearing nevertheless court should require security in an appropriate 
becomes part of the trial record and need not be amount. Subparagraph (2), which is new, 
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Rule 65A, Injunctions. 
(a) Preliminary injunctions. 
(a)(1) Notice. No preliminary injunction shall be issued without notice to the 
adverse party. 
(a)(2) Consolidation of hearing. Before or after the commencement of the 
hearing of an application for a preliminary injunction, the court may order the 
trial of the action on the merits to be advanced and consolidated with the 
hearing of the application. Even when this consolidation is not ordered, any 
evidence received upon an application for a preliminary injunction which 
would be admissible at the trial on the merits becomes part of the trial record 
and need not be repeated at the trial. This subdivision (a)(2) shall be so 
construed and applied as to save to the parties any rights they may have to 
trial by jury. 
(b) Temporary restraining orders. 
(b)(1) Notice. No temporary restraining order shall be granted without 
notice to the adverse party or that party's attorney unless (A) it clearly appears 
from specific facts shown by affidavit or by the verified complaint that 
immediate and irreparable injury, loss, or damage will result to the applicant 
before the adverse party or that party's attorney can be heard in opposition, 
and (B) the applicant or the applicant's attorney certifies to the court in writing 
as to the efforts, if any, that have been made to give notice and the reasons 
supporting the claim that notice should not be required. 
(b)(2) Form of order. Every temporary restraining order shall be endorsed 
with the date and hour of issuance and shall be filed forthwith in the clerk's 
office and entered of record. The order shall define the injury and state why it 
is irreparable. The order shall expire by its terms within such time after entry, 
not to exceed ten days, as the court fixes, unless within the time so fixed the 
order, for good cause shown, is extended for a like period or unless the party 
against whom the order is directed consents that it may be extended for a 
longer period. The reasons for the extension shall be entered of record. 
(b)(3) Priority of hearing. If a temporary restraining order is granted, the 
motion for a preliminary injunction shall be scheduled for hearing at the 
earliest possible time and takes precedence over all other civil matters except 
older matters of the same character. When the motion comes on for hearing, 
the party who obtained the temporary restraining order shall have the burden 
to show entitlement to a preliminary injunction; if the party does not do so, the 
court shall dissolve the temporary restraining order. 
(b)(4) Dissolution or modification. On two days' notice to the party who 
obtained the temporary restraining order without notice, or on such shorter 
notice to that party as the court may prescribe, the adverse party may appear 
and move its dissolution or modification. In that event the court shall proceed 
to hear and determine the motion as expeditiously as the ends of justice 
require. 
(c) Security. 
(c)(1) Requirement. The court shall condition issuance of the order or 
injunction on the giving of security by the applicant, in such sum and form as 
the court deems proper, unless it appears that none of the parties will incur or 
suffer costs, attorney fees or damage as the result of any wrongful order or 
injunction, or unless there exists some other substantial reason for dispensing 
with the requirement of security. No such security shall be required of the 
United States, the State of Utah, or of an officer, agency, or subdivision of 
either; nor shall it be required when it is prohibited by law. 
(c)(2) Amount not a limitation. The amount of security shall not establish or 
limit the amount of costs, including reasonable attorney fees incurred in 
connection with the restraining order or preliminary injunction, or damages 
that mav be awarded to a party who is found to have been wrongfully 
EXHIBIT B 
SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION 
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20549 
FORM8-K 
CURRENT REPORT 
PURSUANT TO SECTION 13 OR 15(d) OF THE 
SECURITIES EXCHANGE ACT OF 1934 
Date of Report: June 28,2000 
(Date of earliest event reported) 
MEDISYS TECHNOLOGIES, INC. 
(Exact name of Registrant as specified in charter) 
Utah 0-21441 72-1216734 
(State or other juris- (Commission (HIS Employer 
diction of incorporation) File No.) Identification No.) 
144 Napoleon Street, Baton Rouge, Louisiana 70802 
(Address of Principal Executive Offices) (Zip Code) 
Registrant's telephone no., including area code: (225) 343-8022 
N/A 
(Former Name or Former Address, if Changed Since Last Report) 
Item 5. Other Events. 
On March 16,2000, Medisys Technologies, Inc. (the "Company") 
filed a Complaint against Brett Phillips, Elbert Carl Anderson, 
William H. Morris, Marilyn Morris and Barbara Larkins in the United 
States District Court in and for the Middle District of Louisiana, 
alleging various securities law violations and related claims in 
connection with the 1998 acquisition by the Company from the 
defendants of Phillips Pharmatech Labs, Inc. ("Phillips"). The 
Company is seeking recission of the acquisition, damages and other 
relief. 
On May 9,2000, £. Carl Anderson, William Morris and Brett 
Phillips, filed a derivative action lawsuit in the United States 
District Court, Middle District of Florida, case number 
8:00CV905-T 24F, against the Company and the current directors of 
the Company. The action was filed by Messrs. Anderson, Morris and Phillips acting by and 
in behalf of the Company. The complaint alleges corporate waste in the form of excessive 
salaries and bonuses and other alleged wastes related to Phillips. The complaint seeks 
injunctive relief and damages. Each of the plaintiffs in this action is also a defendant in the 
lawsuit previously filed by the Company referenced above. 
On May 18, 2000, Phillips ceased all operations. In connection with the Company's March 16, 2000 lawsuit, it 
filed with the Third District Court, Salt Lake County, Utah, an action seeking an injunction to prevent the sale 
and/or transfer of shares of the Company's common stock by various defendants in the Company's suit and other 
parties. On June 28,2000, the Utah Court issued an injunction and order enjoining from transfer approximately 
13,500,000 shares of the Company's common stock. The Company believes that it is vital to the success of its 
suit to prevent certain persons from selling and/or transferring shares prior to the resolution of the action. 
Pursuant to the Court's order, the aforementioned shares are to be deemed "restricted securities" and all 
certificates representing said share shall bear an appropriate restrictive legend. 
Item 7. Financial Statements and Exhibits, (c) Exhibits Exhibit No. Description Page No. 
99.2 Injunction and Order issued on June 28,2000 Filed Herewith By the Third District Court, Salt Lake 
County, Utah 
SIGNATURES 
Pursuant to the requirements of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, the Registrant has duly caused this report 
to be signed on its behalf by the undersigned thereunto duly authorized. 
MEDISYS TECHNOLOGIES, INC. 
Dated: July 21, 2000 By: Isl Kerry M. Frey KERRY M. FREY, President and Chief Operating Officer 
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EXHIBIT C 
FILED DISTRICT C O W 
Third Judicial District 
APu Q 3 aetf 
SALT Utft COUNT -
T Deputy Clerk 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
MEDISYS TECHNOLOGIES, INC., 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
INTERSTATE TRANSFER CO., 
Defendant. 
MINUTE ENTRY 
CASE NO. 000904474 
Intervener's Motion for Award of Fees was presented to me for 
decision pursuant to a Notice to Submit filed on March 8, 2001. I 
have previously determined that the intervenor is entitled to an 
award of attorney's fees in connection with its defense of the 
above-captioned action for injunctive relief. I now find that the 
amount of attorney's fees sought by the intervenor, $30,846, is 
reasonable in light of the complexity of the litigation. I further 
find the hourly rates charged by intervener's counsel to be 
reasonable. I reject plaintiff's contention that the activities of 
Mr. Dykes and Mr. Spencer were excessive in light of the issues 
presented. Lastly, I reject the contention that the fee 
application was inflated by double billing. 
MEDISYS TECH. V. 
INTERSTATE TRANSFER PAGE 2 MINUTE ENTRY 
Intervener's counsel shall prepare an Order consistent with 
this Minute Entry. 
Dated this -^ day of-March-, 2001. 
RONALD 
DISTRIC 
MEDISYS TECH. V. 
INTERSTATE TRANSFER PAGE 3 MINUTE ENTRY 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing Minute Entry, to the following, this day of March, 
2001: 
Richard J. Leedy 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
44 West 300 South, Suite 703 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Michael D. Ward 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
5940 Tahoe Drive, SE, Suite 200 
Grand Rapids, Michigan 49545 
John Michael Coombs 
Attorney for Defendant 
124 South 600 East, Suite 300 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 
Lon A. Jenkins 
Mark W. Dykes 
Attorney for Defendants in Intervention 
136 S. Main, Suite 100 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Thomas E. Spencer 
19235 U.S. Highway 41 North 
Lutz, Florida 33519 
EXHIBIT D 
J, 
" - . _ ^ 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT "<* 
IN AND FOR 8ALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
MEDISYS TECHNOLOGIES, INC., 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
INTERSTATE TRANSFER CO., 
Defendant. 
MINUTE ENTRY 
CASE NO. 000904474 
Intervener's Motion for Clarification was presented to me for 
decision pursuant to a Notice to Submit filed on May 10, 2001. My 
review of the file confirms the intervenorfs observation that I 
overlooked the intervenorfs application for fees associated with 
intervenorfs application for a fee award. I reject the argument 
advanced by Medisys that Rule 65A does not authorize fee awards of 
this nature. I decline, however, to award fees associated with 
travel time and travel expenses. 
I decline to accept Medisys1 invitation to revisit my original 
fee determination. 
Intervener's counsel shall prepare an Order consistent with 
this Minute Entry. 
Dated this /^  day of June, 2001. 
^^^AAJJA /si 
RONALD E. NEHRI 
DISTRICT COURT 
MEDISYS TECH. V. 
INTERSTATE TRANSFER PAGE 2 MINUTE ENTRY 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing Minute Entry, to the following, this \\) day of June, 
2001: 
Bryon J. Benevento 
Matthew M. Boley 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
15 W. South Temple, Suite 1200 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Michael D. Ward 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
5940 Tahoe Drive, SE, Suite 200 
Grand Rapids, Michigan 49545 
John Michael Coombs 
Attorney for Defendant 
124 South 600 East, Suite 300 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 
Lon A. Jenkins 
Mark W. Dykes 
Attorney for Defendants in Intervention 
136 S. Main, Suite 100 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
